FOLLOWING ON from what has generally become known as “Black October 2008”, the South African Civil Aviation’s General Aviation Safety Initiative (GASI) was established.
Its objective, according to the CEO of the SACAA, Colin Jordaan, was to “reduce by 50 % the 2008 total number of aircraft accidents by the year 2011.” This a tall order by any means, considering that there were at least 224 accidents and incidents recorded in South Africa in 2008, so 50% of all accidents and incidents, essentially equates to a reduction of approximately 112 accidents and incidents.
Theoretically, it should not be a real problem because, in South Africa, the general aviation population is a highly skilled and disciplined grouping of pilots that perform professionally; never get their aircraft into situations from which they cannot recover; have no problems handling small aircraft in aggressive weather conditions outside of the flight envelope of the aircraft; they always calculate the mass and balance before each flight and ensure that the aircraft is filled with sufficient fuel to meet the specific range/endurance requirements that could be encountered during flight.
They do not engage in reckless low-flying, so, it should not be a problem! WRONG! The RSA accident/incident statistics indicate otherwise. In an article published in World Airnews in April 2009 and titled: “General Aviation Pilots, Get Your Act Together” which reviewed the CAA accident data base for the years 2005 to 2008, it was concluded as much as 72% of the accidents involved human error, negligence, poor judgement and poor flying skills. In this category, 62% of the pilots involved were from the general aviation grouping. The average accident rate per month per year was an unacceptably high 20, and 207 deaths were recorded over the four year period.
A bigger surprise, though, was the acrimonious response to the hard cold facts that people were dying and aircraft were being destroyed. One would have expected a more humble approach from GA pilots in which acknowledgement of the problems facing South African civil aviation were recognised, and efforts made at interrogating the GA systems within the country, etc. Instead, a rather arrogant and aggressive response to the interpretation of the statics as a CAA deception tactic, was mooted by a few individuals in an effort to steer away from the fact that South Africa’s general flight safety, was under threat.
How significant the problem was, could only be determined by making a comprehensive assessment of the aircraft accidents /incidents over the last 10 years to quantify its extent in an effort to develop a coherent safety strategy for general aviation in the country. Without being able to quantify the extent of the problem, it would be difficult to develop a turnaround strategy.
Disraeli’s reported use of the phrase; “Lies, damned lies and statistics” could, in the case of the South Africa, easily be converted to “Lies, damn lies and aviation safety statistics”. The general consensus among the CAA,
some aviators, and flying schools, has to date been that the aviation accident rate in South Africa is unacceptably high. This may have been so for the years 1999 to 2006, but surprisingly, statistics indicate that SA’s general aviation safety has, in fact, been improving since the peak in 2006 and although higher than the previous ten years, a distinct decrease in the number of accidents and incidents is evident.
DATA SOURCE
Accident/incident data for this article was provided by the SACAA and Dennis Jankelow & Associates. It is prudent to note that the CAA does not record or investigate minor accidents or incidents; this in itself is unacceptable since Byrd’s Triangle (see Figure 1 overleaf) clearly describes the theoretical relationship between incidents and accidents, more particularly, for every 3 000 incidents, there are a number of minor accidents and at least one fatality.
If a safety organisation is not aware of the hazards and consequent incidents driving the accident rate from the bottom of the triangle, it will forever struggle to get to grips with the idiosyncrasies of a particular system. The SACAA unfortunately does not normally record the number of flying hours flown annually to enable benchmarking with international safety statistics, which is unsatisfactory for statistical analyses. It is recommended that SACAA institute a mechanism for the recording of all flying hours in the RSA each year as is done worldwide. For purposes of this analysis, and in contravention of all rules of statistical analysis, the only other metric to determine the amount of flying hours indirectly is to use the number of aircraft registered on the CAA database, which was recently updated prior to the ICAO audit. T
his method is flawed and is not an accurate one and only serves to indicate that any increase in the number of accidents, was attributable to the increased flying activities derived from the increased number of aircraft flying in South Africa.
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT DATA ANALYSIS
A total of 2 164 accidents/incidents was reported over the 10,75 year period from 1999 if 2009 is included up until end September 2009. In all, 441 lives were lost during this period, implying an average of approximately 41 deaths per annum. The report does not address injuries, only fatalities.
There was an increase in the average number of accidents/incidents per month from 13,5 in 1999 to 21,25 in 2006. This is an increase on average of 0,7 accidents /incidents per month, per year. The nonavailability of actual hours flown per year prevents international benchmarking against universal standards. To make sense of the statistics, it is essential that hours flown annually for each category of aircraft operations in the RSA are collected and collated.
Average: The average number of accidents/ incidents over the 10,7 year period was 17,2. At the current rate for 2009, linear extrapolation predicts an accident/incident rate of 13, the lowest over the last nearly 11 years. This is considered significant not only because of the absolute decrease of the average, but because of the downward trend which could enable the achievement of the GASI objective of 50% reduction in accident/incidents if sustained over the next three years.
Trend: The linear trend over the past ten years has been an increase, although a slight decrease was indicated from 2007 and 2008. 2009 onwards will determine the future propagation of this trend. The predicted average for 2009 at the current rate is 13, which is 5,7 incidents/accidents per month better on average than 2008 and is significantly better than the 10 year average of 17,2 per month, a significant improvement in both cases.
Is this a real improvement or merely within the scatter band of a general increase? On-going analysis for public disclosure on an annual basis by SACAA to the general aviation community is recommended.
On-going analysis for public disclosure on an annual basis by SACAA to the general aviation community is recommended.
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